What will we see?  Who will be his starting 11?  How will they play?  What will be more attack-minded about this U.S. team?  And how much can be done in such short amount of time?  Questions surround tonight's U.S.-Mexico friendly.

News from the U.S. camp has been positive with reports of a definitive change in the energy and feel to the team.  Everyone's out to prove themselves and impress the new coach (including his temporary assistants). The slate's been wiped clean, and there's a lot to play for.

So even though it's a friendly, stakes will be raised, and not just for the United States. Mexico has reclaimed the top spot in this CONCACAF friendly after their convincing 4-2 win in this year's Gold Cup Final.

But, without star Manchester United striker Javier "Chicharito" Hernandez, Mexico will be looking to prove they can beat the U.S. no matter who is on the field. They've brought back the same squad that played in the Gold Cup, so it appears the Mexican side is taking tonight's friendly in Philadelphia very, very seriously.

I'll be posting quick observations and reactions throughout the game, so be sure to check back and see what's developed.

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"America, you will finally have your attack-minded soccer."

And as the sports programming cut to the next thirty-second story, that was it.

ESPN analysts Alexi Lalas may have summed up the questions fans had after the comment with one of his more astute comments as he said that he'd like specifics.

Wednesday's friendly against Mexico will be the first concrete example of what attack-minded American soccer might be. A no matter the outcome, there will be reactions, positive and negative, surrounding the international friendly.

But realistically, what significant gains can be made in such short amount of time?

Probably little, which has been expressed by a number of writers at a number of sports outlets.

Then of course they've gone on to list all the caveats surrounding Klinsmann's hiring, all in an attempt to temper America's euphoria over landing such a star-studded coach.

Here are a couple of reasons for skepticism:

Klinsmann doesn't even have a permanent coaching staff.

The transitional state of the U.S. national team and the age of its players.

Or, keep in mind, Klinsmann has signed a contract for four years, not the eight-to-twelve year minimum needed to change an entire federation's mentality (see Uruguay or Germany for examples of time lines and implementation of nationwide changes in training).

That nothing in the style of play has been spelled out, except for in some document written and made available to "properly trained" American youth coaches by Claudio Reyna. Oh, and Klinsmann wasn't involved with the creation of that document.

Then there's the criticisms cast against Klinsmann and his managing of Bayern Munich, claims that Joachim Loew, not Klinsmann, was the mastermind behind Germany's success. 

As well as the fact that the United States and its soccer infrastructure (or lack thereof) have little in common with Germany's. It's easier to adjust or add to a style of play rather than "create" one, especially from the top down.

Despite the belief that runs between the lines of many of these articles, said or implied, that American soccer fans are ignorant (I'm speaking of soccer followers, not the casual observer), fans understand there's a reason for excitement.

In an recent interview for Goal.com found here, Tim Ream may have summed up exactly why fans have a more positive outlook with Klinsmann in charge: 

“For me it’s exciting to hear that he wants to control games,” said Ream. “It’s more fun for the players to control the game and the ball, be all over teams and execute counterattacks instead of waiting to react. No one likes to defend for 90 minutes.”

Ream should have probably been more specific. American athletes wish to more of an influence on the direction of a game.

He gets closer to the mark when he follows up the comment with, “We [players] like to dictate the flow of games and I think bringing that attitude to the team is definitely a step in the right direction.”

It would be hard to argue against Ream's philosophy. His reckless tackle against Panama certainly dictated the direction of that game, just not in the direction he desired. Still, I'm sure Ream would defend his decision, or any decision to act in that game was better than letting Panama take the game to the U.S.

The alternative was exactly what the U.S. had under Bob Bradley.

This is the underlying issue the casual observer may have missed in the changing of the American soccer guard.

There were reasons enough for firing Bradley (my list of the ten most obvious reasons can be found here) as well as keeping him on.

Bradley did a decent job; he stabilized the program when it could have digressed into something resembling its early years, during the eighties and nineties.

The major sports news outlets took this approach when covering Bradley's firing. It got so bad that the underlying message behind this atrocious article was, "Bradley is a good guy, so he was a good coach for the U.S."

But what they didn't cover was what Ream addressed, what fans were feeling about a Bradley team, and American soccer analysts should have captured. It was why so many supporters were upset even under an arguably decent coach.

Little in the way the team played felt American.

I'm really surprised so few analysts caught on to the underlying conversation, but thanks to Klinsmann, this is the discussion we're having. And, perhaps, the one the rest of the world is having.

Here are some of those questions:

What are American fans looking for in their team's play? How do we want to play as a nation, be it in an international match or on recreational soccer fields throughout the United States?

Who exactly is the "we" in the United States? How do "we" express that in the way we play the world's game?

Why do a bunch of people at U.S. Soccer—some who haven't even played the game—get to decide how an entire nation should play? Shouldn't it be something that originates from the local level, not the other way around? Throughout soccer history its been a little bit of both.

Collectively, "we" will decide America's preferred style of play, the federation, the MLS, Gulati, Klinsmann, youth coaches, the rich and the poor. And that will, of course, take some time. It may take more time than Klinsmann has with the team, and "we" may not like what we get and want to head in a different direction.

One way of looking at Bradley's time in charge of the U.S. is exactly that.

American soccer went down a road those in charge—the players and the fans—weren't comfortable with. So we changed course. These are the growing pains of a young soccer country.

So what should we look for in the short-term since it's harder to judge what will happen long-term?

Ream's comments and the style of play for the team under Bradley may give us a small list:

1.  Be assertive, even if you lose.

Americans are a brash people. For better or worse, we have opinions and we want to be heard. How can American players go into a game where they must sit back and let the other team put their imprint on the game?

How frustrating must it be for an American player to sit back and let a team or a player come at them again and again? For example, the organized, passive, bend-don't-break, defense Bradley employed against better teams like Spain, Argentina and Brazil

Sometimes it got results, but what can be taken from such a game? How can that be applied to lesser teams? How draining does such a game feel? And is it a victory when a team defends all barrages and feels like it "survived" rather than won? 

And what happens once the team breaks (i.e., goes down a goal)? How difficult is it to change mentalities?

This happened again and again under Bradley.

As Ream mentioned, American players will probably be more comfortable attempting to influence the direction of a game, even if they fail.

It's easier to be involved, to feel as if a player is controlling his destiny, and at the end of the game, the coach, players, and fans can feel like the team gave everything in an attempt to win rather than in hopes of not losing. 

This is a slight difference, but one American fans understand no matter what the sport.

2. Be passionate

While Bradley's organized, disciplined, defensive approach was probably the right choice in the beginning, after a few years of implementation, the bend-don't-break mentality seemed to undermine the team.

All it took was one sweep of the camera over the team during the national anthem to see how tight most of the players looked. It was as if the team was collectively going over a checklist in their heads: Don't get out of position, make sure to come back on defense, keep track of your defensive mark, etc.

The cerebral, intense, team cohesion/defensive approach took something out of the players and their play.

Outside of Clint Dempsey and Tim Howard (when he's yelling at his defense or complaining about the language of the trophy celebration), few national team players wear their emotions openly.

Americans are one of the more emotionally open cultures (think of the Japanese for a comparison and notice their style of play). Shouldn't our play embody the essence of that emotion?

I use "essence" because, of course, emotion, especially when out-of-control passion, is not always good.

Jermaine Jones (the irony in his German-American heritage isn't lost on me) is an example of emotion that can go too far. Petulant fouls can hurt the team. Michael Bradley could also get too emotional, but I've had a couple conversations lately where someone claimed his game has been hurt as he tries to be too "in control."

All one needs to do is look to American sports commercials. Most contain a screaming athlete at some point. 

American soccer needs its screaming, passionate sports clip, too.

It's a delicate balance, passion versus control, but even Wayne Rooney can manage it (and I think a number of American sports fans identify with him; he embodies blue-collar, focused passion).

3. Enjoy the game

When was the last time the U.S. looked like it was having fun? 2002?

This last goal is directly connected to No. 2, and probably No. 1 as both imply the team would be more comfortable playing a certain way, and if they play that way, then they'll probably have more fun. 

Maybe it's the Latin influences on American culture. Maybe it's because soccer is considered "the beautiful game." Or maybe it's because we consider sports "games" at all, but there needs to be joy in American soccer.

Even at the youth level, there's not enough of it, and it's hurting soccer's progress in this country. Our national team players need to be the role models for this style of play.

Whatever the case may be, we watched sports to escape, to watch those more talented than ourselves do the miraculous and unimaginable.

Americans don't want their teams to just win, we want moments. We want to say we were there or when it's happening on the other side of the world, say we saw it happen live on television.  We want it to be etched in our memory forever.

That doesn't happen only when the team gets its result, especially in soccer. We want to see moments of brilliance, individual or team-wise. And that usually happens when players are enjoying themselves. 

Again, we see evidence of joy in all the other sports advertised in the United States. Yes, there are commercials and replays of hard work, but there is also joy in hitting a home run, striking out a player, scoring a touchdown, dunking a basketball or dribbling by an opponent. And, of course, lifting a trophy.

But the trophies only come after all the other displays. It's the only way it'll happen for the U.S., too.

All of these short-term goals are abstract.

For a number of reasons they need to be. We don't have all the answers to the questions mentioned earlier, so it may not be possible to be more specific.

Also, as mentioned earlier, it takes time. More time than one camp, one qualifying campaign, or even one World Cup cycle to implement. 

But after the disappointment of the Gold Cup, of realizing this team wasn't going to get better by 2014, that there was little enjoyment in the way the team had played, talking, even in abstract terms, of American soccer, and of change, is a bright spot for this program. 

Hopefully, that's what we'll be on display against Mexico.

But for the Mexico game and for the qualifying soccer, I can guarantee an assertive, passionate, fun-loving United States team has a pretty good chance of being embraced by its American fans.

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The United States beat Panama 1-0 after a late counter-attack goal from Clint Dempsey. The assist came from struggling Landon Donovan, who came on as a substitute, and the play was started by Freddy Adu; the entire play was wrapped up in a heart warming package.

But there may be some out there that were a little unnerved by the game.

Missing on the day was much of the panic-ridden, edge-of-your-seat emotion and play that has come to exemplify a constantly under-performing/overperforming U.S. team. Instead, they controlled most of the possession, and other than a short burst at the end of the match, Panama had few true opportunities.

It must have been nice for the U.S. to be on the other end of such a performance.

Granted, all the kinks haven't been worked out of the system; it's not like the U.S. had that many chances.

Still, it's a trade off. Panama didn't have as many quality chances, scored fewer goals and was less of a threat overall, and isn't that better than the outcome of the previous meeting with Panama?

For the semifinal, Panama once again ceded possession and territory.

And once again, the U.S. struggled to break down Panama's defense—a defense that was once again quite similar to the American style of play against stronger opponents—a compact, well organized defense willing to give up space well into their own half.

As a side note, Panama did well for itself in this tournament. They have some talented players and showed their organization, and team focus. The players and coach did much to improve their status. Clearly, they're a dangerous side.

However, the U.S. had the majority of possession, and it seemed to be a game against the clock. Will the U.S. score before they run out of time and it becomes a penalty kick crap-shoot?

Against Panama, they did, and now they'll be playing Mexico in the Gold Cup final.

There's one caveat moving forward though. Get used to this style of play from Bob Bradley's team, so everyone better work up some patience to handle it.

And it will be an exciting future too, even if the run of play doesn't seem like it.

It's better than the alternative (the aforementioned edge-of-the-seat, "Why can't we play like we're professionals?" insults thrown at televisions in bars across America).

The team did not let in the early goal, or allow an early chance like the one Jamaica missed. Plus, Panama's first real chance didn't happen until right before the half.

In just changing the nature and the feel of the game, the formation paid off, despite the goal not even being a direct result of the formation. Instead, it was a counter attack that included the "best U.S. counter-attack player" Landon Donovan (sorry Kyle Martino, your claim that Donovan is the "best American player ever," is up for debate, but more on Martino, his announcing and analysis later).

Now comes the real question: how does the U.S. get more, especially offensively, out of the system?

The way this U.S. team plays its 4-5-1, it's much closer to Sir Alex Ferguson's Manchester United strategy of making sure to "have a strong defensive line and let everyone else run around."

This system works really well when those runners are Cristiano Ronaldo, Wayne Rooney, Carlos Tevez and one player from a pool of Scholes, Giggs, Berbatov, Park, Nani, Valencia, you name the player (all one-time United players to play under that strategy).

And there must be value in this style as Ferguson's most recent Manchester United's team has a similar feel to its play.

So maybe Bob Bradley's on to something. Writers steal from the best, why shouldn't coaches?

It may not be the same (International teams can't buy their players, and the U.S. doesn't have the likes of Ronaldo, Rooney and Tevez in its player pool), but the formation can work for the United States.

Since Bradley is a defense-first type of guy, his version of the formation has four true attacking players, the forward and three supporting midfielders, then if everything's good, his outside backs and hopefully another central midfielder supporting the offense.

Call it a 4-2-3-1, a 2-4-3-1, whatever you would like, the formation varies throughout the game, but the point is, the majority of the offensive duties hang on the play of four offensive players.

Unfortunately though, the game is won or lost on how well the supporting players, both offensively and defensively, are involved in the play.

If the outside backs don't get up the field, the play breaks down. If another center midfielder doesn't get involved in the attack, either by making the right run, the right pass or the right shot (Jones against Jamaica), then the team can't maintain pressure and create opportunities.

Even Barcelona, the best club team in the world this year, recognized this and always has two out of its three center midfielders involved in the offense; even Barcelona couldn't sit back and let four offensive players play against the opposition, and they have Lionel Messi.

This is where patience comes into play.

In future games, the U.S. needs to maintain possession, something Agudelo seems to have a better feel for than Altidore, and this may be why he's getting more out of this system along with the more technically sound players on the squad (in the end, technique trumps all, doesn't it?).

As games unfold, the U.S. can discover which matchups benefit which players, what space is being granted, where to exploit the defense, etc., but again, that takes time, patience, intelligence and the confidence that it will happen. This is all new territory for Americans.

How many times have fans seen a team give up on its game-plan when there aren't immediate awards?

This is the danger with the current state of affairs for the U.S.

If they become frustrated, especially since the new formation and tactics aren't proven, they could give up on what may go down as one of the most important changes this team has made under Bob Bradley.

This will be Bob Bradley's test. Can he get his team to believe in his changes?

To the team's credit against Panama, the Americans stuck with the plan. They could have just as easily thrown it out.

The game was never as simple as Kyle Martino, announcer and analyst for Fox Sports for the Panama game, pointed out. In fact, the U.S. really needed to do the opposite of whatever he claimed on the night.

This is especially strange coming from a person that used to play for the national team, but then again, he may be unfamiliar with the system, and everyone sees soccer differently.

But the team wasn't going to break down the defense by switching the ball 40 to 60 yards like he claimed (and they never did).

Whether it was, as Clint Dempsey claimed in his post-game interview, that the field was narrow and that made it more difficult to break down a compact defense (it certainly makes it easier to recover and rotate to the far end of the field when it's not that far away) or the fact that the U.S. player usually on the end of the switch wasn't the technically gifted player needing the ball, in any case, that plan never worked.

And the Panama game wasn't the first time announcers have called for the quick switch of fields from the Americans.

As humans, we like balance. The U.S. hasn't had a balanced attack lately, and there's a belief that the rotation will open up holes in a defense. The U.S. team has struggled to move the ball horizontally with any sort of speed, but the same could be said for their vertical movement as well.

Unless there's a mismatch, or Cristiano Ronaldo, or perhaps a player closer to home like Clint Dempsey on the end of a switching of the fields or on the end of a one-two combination coming as a direct result of the switch, then a drastic and timely rotation doesn't have the effect it needs to have.

It's too easy for defenders to adjust.

Against Panama, it was usually Eric Lichaj on the end of a switch. Unfortunately, he didn't have the dribbling skills (he is a defender) or the support to break down the defense on a switch. It's why he's much more dangerous off the ball than with it.

Martino was also wrong in claiming that Agudelo should have stayed on Panama's center defenders.

Agudelo received the ball in the spaces between the center and outside defenders where he had the space to face the defense or play a ball to the supporting players (outside defenders like Lichaj and Cherundolo) and start an attack.

Agudelo played the situation right, against larger, bulkier defenders, an offender needs to get them moving and off-balance.

It's exactly this type of play that got Goodson in trouble right before the half. He was out on the corner of the eighteen (same place Agudelo got most of his balls), and the Panamanian player beat Goodson with his pace and skill. Agudelo's instincts were right.

By the second half, it became apparent that if the U.S. was going to score with their new style of play, their best bet would be down the center of the field.

And this is exactly where the U.S. is going to have most of its problems with this system. If teams force the U.S. to play down the center of the field, it's going to get bumpy.

Zac Lee Rigg at goal.com echoed this sentiment in his quick review of the game (his whole article is here):

"Panama also lined up in a 4-2-3-1. Whereas Jason Morrison had to push forward from his flat midfield role to try to mark America's deeper midfielders, Panama already had guys in that space.

In particular, Nelson Barahona, who proved fairly influential on the ball as well, sat behind the lone striker Luis Tejada (Blas Perez was suspended) and denied easy transitions for the U.S.

Bradley and Jones have their upsides, including stamina, heart, a knack for timing late runs, and good size. Releasing the ball well under pressure is not among either of their strong suits.

Jones in particular slammed the ball to the forward-most American player as soon as he caught a glimpse of Barahona out of the corner of his eye. Those long balls never paid off, which isn't surprising given Juan Agudelo's more technical game."

Panama wanted the U.S. to switch the ball and get it to its less technically skilled defenders before they were in an offensive position to play in the cross or get the quick one-two. Time and again, once the outside players got the ball, Panama went to break up the attack.

Over the course of two games, the space between the holding midfielders and Panama's two center defenders was the most dangerous spot.

This was proved over two games as Agudelo could hold the ball there, Dempsey, Bedoya and Kljestan started attacks from here, Panama defenders fouled immediately in this area, and any other type of attack from any other area was either snuffed out or headed out by the giant backs for Panama, excepting Goodson's header on a set play of course.

It was clear Panama wanted to avoid play through the middle.

And Panama did so successfully too. If it wasn't for a Panama corner where the defense was finally stretched (notice: vertically, not horizontally), then who knows if the U.S. would have ever score?

Rigg addresses this in the second part of his argument.

On offense, Jones and Bradley tend to clog space. They don't really move from the five to 10 yards in front of their center defenders. Beyond going back to get the ball from the feet of their defenders, they don't finish out their runs.

They jog a few feet to the side.  What's worse, when they have the ball, Jones, as Riggs said, plays a long ball, or in Bradley's case, passes mostly sideways or backwards.

A center midfielder's offensive life depends on a few qualities: movement, passing ability and ball skills.

Jones and Bradley aren't the best dribblers, they're inconsistent passers, so they have to move. They didn't against Panama. Instead, they blocked the passing lanes that opened up the attack.

For the Gold Cup Final against Mexico, try watching the game with a center midfielder (I watched the Panama game with two of them) and watch how they react to the movement, or lack there of, from America's center midfielders. For the semifinal, the center midfielders I knew were screaming at the television.

Usually, Bob Bradley's in-game changes are stronger than his preparation, so I was shocked he didn't address this glaring problem at half time.

On the one hand though, I can understand why he didn't make a change. Does Bradley sacrifice the cover he has for two inconsistent central defenders after he's already pushed his outside backs forward?

Can these same backs pass the ball accurately and not turn it over and cause a counter where Panama is most dangerous?

At some point, Bob Bradley is going to have to work out this issue if the U.S. struggles to convert possession into scoring opportunities. 

Jermaine Jones and Michael Bradley are going to have to offer more to the offense (I know Jones scored and caused the dismissal of a Jamaican player in the quarterfinal, but that seems to be the exception rather than the rule in his short career for the U.S.).

Also, how will Jones, Bradley, and the team fair in their new formation with a better opponent that pressures defensively, wants possession, is technically skilled and fast...like Mexico?

One player that might benefit from the system is Landon Donovan. A 4-5-1 can give him the space to run at defenders, but again, the team will need to be stretched vertically. Still, after his goal against Panama, he needs to be on the field.

If that danger is present, then teams will need to adjust their plans, and that can lead to other opportunities.

As a side note, did Clint Dempsey's point to Landon Donovan after the goal seem excessive? I'd buy the man a drink after the game too for making the perfect pass, and only pass to score a goal in that case, but what did that mean?

And why point that out? Did Dempsey disagree with the benching? Are they best friends? Is Dempsey worried he'll never get a pass like that again? Is he telling his teammates, "This is how you pass?"

In any case, Donovan earned his starting spot back, especially after Kljestan's abysmal play. Congratulations Donovan, I hope the slump's over.

Back to the team, if Bob Bradley doesn't figure out how to get more offense out of his defensive midfielders, then he falls into a trap similar to the problem Italian club teams have run into once they started mimicking Arrigo Sacchi's great AC Milan teams of the late '80s and early '90s.

Sacchi claimed that his organized defense was actually an offense.

He claimed that his team forced the ball to players they wanted to have the ball, and then they took it from them. Italians interpreted this as a defensive strategy (because they pressed high and had a high offensive-trap minded defense), but it ended up putting his team and his best players in beneficial positions.

He also expected to have players wide and five attackers in front of the ball (and stressed movement. Does this sound familiar?).

So other Italian teams mimicked Sacchi's defense and not the offense. And now soccer has the anti-football many Italian teams have been known for.

In the same way, Bob Bradley risks turning a formation developed to get the most offense out of attackers that aren't quite forwards and not quite midfielders and to utilize numbers by including outside fullbacks.

How comfortable would it make a conservative, defensive minded coach to keep two defensive midfielders in front of two defenders with the option of pulling his outside fullbacks back and then, if needs be, pull 10 men behind the ball if necessary? 

The temptation is there, and if Bob Bradley and his team aren't patient, then this could be the case. Bradley could turn a formation created to get every inch of offensive ability out of great teams and make it the super-defensive formation he might dream about at night.

If the team can't find young defenders to handle the center of the field, then the team can't push forward.

Goodson and Bocanegra aren't performing at a level that instills that type of confidence. Plus, once one considers Bocanegra's age (and Cherundolo's for that matter), this issue isn't going away.

Consequently, the glut of American talent is in the midfield. Donovan, Dempsey, the current good form of Bedoya, Kljestan (until last game), Adu, and the talent of injured Feilhaber and Holden, as well as the defensive talents of Jones and M. Bradley.

This means that Bob Bradley has the options and talent to work with any tweak to his 4-5-1 system, be it offensive or defensively.

He just needs to have the defenders in his team, the intelligence to recognize the changes needed to be made (He didn't make them against Panama and that may include benching his son, something he's very loathe to do even though Michael Bradley has been the weakest starting player since Donovan's timely assist) and for his players to trust and execute the plan.

And that takes time...and patience.

And then there's Mexico. This team will press, it will hold the ball, it's a technically sound team with strong, young and talented forwards. They're fast, and they move.

Will Bradley and Co. panic? Will they give up on their new system? Will they make it an ultra-defensive tactic? Or will they have faith? Will the right players be involved?

Perhaps this is why during the pre-game on Fox Sports Eric Wynalda confessed his excitement for the Panama game.

Their should be just as much for the Mexico final, but it shouldn't be the final test for Bradley's new experiment. There's a different feel to this U.S. style of play, and I'd rather be yelling at the television because the team's controlling possession and trying to find a way to break down a defense than bargaining with the soccer gods so that one half-chance can count as a goal.

Read more International Football news on BleacherReport.com

The wins were coming. Qualification looked likely. All the reports were positive.

Then the 2006 World Cup disaster commenced. The U.S. failed to advance, lost to Ghana for the first time, and Bruce Arena was in essence forced to resign.

So far, the Gold Cup appears to be Bob Bradley's version of Arena's qualification cycle.

The squad selection is the status quo, and the tactics look relatively the same as last summer's World Cup. The team is "getting the job done" (a phrase being used by both the players and pundits), but not much else.

To boot, after the United States' opening Gold Cup game against Canada, both Sports Illustrated and ESPN's player rankings were overly positive (their ratings can be found here on SI and here on ESPN) even though the play by the United States was mediocre, Jozy Altidore's goal was a good strike but save-able, and Canada being a sub-par opponent.

The 2-1 loss to Panama was a bit more telling. The U.S., rather ironically, lost to a team that tactically chose to play the same way Bradley's team plays against better opponents: organized and team-defense oriented, waiting for opportunities to counter-attack, and hoping for brilliance from individual attackers.

Strangely, the U.S. couldn't adapt to its mirror image.

And finally, the Guadeloupe 1-0 win was a disappointment to all involved, and unlike Bruce Arena's tenure, players, fans, and pundits are more aware of the situation; this team is not playing well at all.

Why though?

Clint Dempsey is coming off his greatest club season. Donovan enjoyed a strong world cup, outside of Michael Bradley and Altidore, all the starting players are earning first team minutes and experience, and the current roster is a decent mix of veterans and up and coming players.

Based on the teams involved in the Gold Cup, this should be the perfect formula for advancement to the finals, but things are not going as planned.

First, it's clear that CONCACAF teams are getting better, even Guadeloupe can field a professional team.

But that doesn't mean they're all playing in the English Premier League. The United States fields all professional players as well. It only means that any team has enough experience and fitness to be dangerous if a team isn't prepared. Still, the quality of Canada nor Guadeloupe is strong enough to compete on equal footing with the U.S.

The American team should be favored.

But it also means teams like Panama, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador have the talent to upset a mediocre or under-performing American side.

However, that doesn't mean the United States shouldn't win, especially when hosting the Gold Cup. Something else is going on.

A play late in the Guadeloupe game might be a hint at the underlying issue.

Clint Dempsey held the ball at midfield and Landon Donovan was making a run to his left between the outside and center defenders. The right play would have been to attempt a through pass to Donovan on the break.  Instead, as Dempsey is prone to do, he held the ball a touch too long and was fouled by a Guadeloupe defender tracking back.

Granted, Dempsey won the foul, but all momentum was ruined. Naturally, Donovan came back to Dempsey and told him as much. Dempsey responded with an opened armed gesture suggesting "what else do you want from me."

Unfortunately for Dempsey, the answer was clear to everyone watching as well as to Donovan and the announcers.

What may have been missed though was the subtext of the conversation. It doesn't matter if Donovan was right. Somewhere over the last year, Dempsey's game improved dramatically and Donovan's hasn't. Even more importantly, Donovan's tournament play hasn't earned him the right to demand the ball from anyone.

Over the group stage of this tournament, Dempsey has proven himself to be a step above his teammates, and in respect to this evolution, the players feed the ball through him nine times out of ten. This wasn't quite the situation at the World Cup.

Now, Dempsey, by leaps and bounds, is the best available option. No longer is there a sense of camaraderie and equality based on relative levels of skill and experience.

In and of itself, such a situation isn't a bad thing. However, it's clear the team dynamics haven't changed to deal with Dempsey and all of the other issues facing this team.

While the team is aging, some like Dempsey, Donovan and Howard are entering or are in their prime, and Bocanegra and Cherundolo have become the grizzled veterans, there seems to be a lack of true leadership and an overall competitive edge to this team.

It doesn't mean there aren't individual displays of personal motivation. Clint Dempsey pulls down players as he's dribbling by them as he's being fouled. He's clearly motivated.

Michael Bradley and Jermaine Jones appear motivated, but for Bradley, it's translated in his work rate, and Jones, it's displayed with untimely fouls or petulance when being substituted.

In other words, their actions aren't galvanizing the team. There aren't enough players in the starting eleven with that bite, a truly fearsome attitude and reputation that infects the whole team.

Think Nemanja Vidic or Wayne Rooney for Manchester United. Both had a relatively consistent level of play this year and are imposing presences. To an extent, Carlos Puyol and Javier Mascherano serve the same purpose for Barcelona (and these two didn't always start, proving that the source for this style of play can come from anyone).

Yes, these are the two teams that played in the Champions League final, but before that point is used as an excuse, consider the Ghana team that beat the U.S. They played with that same edge and motivation without those players. A team can exude intensity without a squad overflowing with world class talent.

Along with a competitive edge, a team can't win without leadership, but outside of Tim Howard--who is trapped between the goalposts--there just isn't a team leader, a true team captain on the field.

The team, the media, and the coach can talk about quiet leaders, or how Carlos Bocanegra is taking on that mantle as he's moved to the middle of the defense, or how players lead by example.

But a team needs—and in particular this team—needs a veteran leader that demands respect, dictates the style and personality of his squad, determines the pecking order of players (so conflicts like that between Dempsey and Donovan can be decided), is the play-maker and creator for the team, getting everyone involved, and is a vocal, inspirational talisman the team can rally around.

Cherundolo and Bocanegra, being the elder statesmen, should be the ideal candidates, but neither have the presence needed for the job. Whenever the television pans to this theoretical leader's face, there should be a fifty percent chance that it catches the player barking orders, directing traffic, or re-organizing the team.

The camera hasn't caught that U.S. field player on video yet.

With young players being injected into the player pool, a search for defensive replacements, and a core group barely breaking thirty, this team desperately needs that leader. Unfortunately, there are no viable candidates. That dominant, inclusive, personality (Tim Howard), isn't a field player, and can't unify this team.

Outside of the normal criticisms of Bob Bradley's team—which includes tactical issues, player selection, and technical ability—now intangible qualities, like chemistry, heart, and competitiveness are issues.

That's something no one could say about a Bob Bradley team before.

Who is to blame?

Steve Cohen at goal.com believes it comes down to coaching (the link here at Goal.com), and he does a good job backing up his opinion as well as touch upon a couple of other issues I'm addressing as well.

However, for a number of reasons--one being Bradley's flaws have been discussed ad nauseum elsewhere, and since it's unlikely he'll be dismissed no matter what--the blame should be shared from top to bottom.

First, Sunil Gulati and everyone involved in Bradley's rehiring are responsible, but not for the obvious reasons.

A friend of mine posed this question: How many of the players believe or really want to play for Bob Bradley?

In all likelihood, probably very few outside Michael Bradley.

This isn't all Bradley's fault either. By reputation, actual talent, or availability of resources in Europe, most of the foreign based players have coaches equal to or better than Bob Bradley (17 out of the 23 players on the current squad play outside the U.S). He garners little respect through prestige.

Plus, he's a conservative coach.

So what are they to learn of innovative tactics and in their practice sessions that they haven't seen before?

Remember, there's always the idea (however unlikely) that a big name manager might be out there ready to coach this team, and while no player on the current squad would admit to such thoughts, it's there in the back of their minds. There's a big difference between wanting to impress Pepe Guardiola or Jose Mourinho as opposed to Bob Bradley.

That's not Bradley's fault. He can't change who he is. But this is a situation the federation may have underestimated, especially before giving a national team coach a second World Cup cycle.

Bob Bradley stabilized a listless national team and has arguably accomplished more than any other U.S. national team coach. However, this is a different team now, and problems like the current one are exactly why most national team managers fret about overstaying their welcome.

Of course there's Bob Bradley's own mistakes, including his roster and game-day selections. His team needs more offense, but he keeps with an overly conservative central midfield, formation and players.

Instead of working in more of his younger and versatile offensive players (Bedoya, Kljestan, and Adu) against Guadeloupe, he maintains a 1-for-1 substitution strategy (switching Wondolowski for Agudelo and Lichaj for Ream) even though his team looked the best when he was forced to move to a 3-4-3 at the end of the Panama game.

He has allowed freer roles for Dempsey and Donovan. He also recognized the importance of moving Bocanegra to the middle and at the same time getting more width with Lichaj, but these are only half measures; the team's not scoring.

Why not find a way to utilize Sacha and Bedoya, the two players with the broadest skill to support a completely unrestrained Donovan and Dempsey?

Both have looked strong in their cameo roles and understand the system. They smartly (whether instructed or understood) played one touch at the end of the Panama game. Clearly, theyhave something to prove and are motivated.

At the same time, their introduction allows Donovan and Dempsey to push forward and support a front line lacking experience and goal scoring prowess.

Plus, why call up Adu, another offensive player, if he's not going to be used?

Finally, it is a coach's responsibility to motivate his team, create chemistry, and encourage a team philosophy. Otherwise, what is a coach good for? Bradley hasn't done that so far.

Keep in mind though, with adults and professional athletes, this is easier said than done.

In the end, no matter who is the coach or what decisions he makes , it comes down to the players on the field.

Coaches only have three subs during a match. International coaches get limited time with players, and they can't play the game for them, and true motivation comes from the inside, not out.

And motivation isn't the only quality in a player's hands.

Tim Ream's foul to give up a penalty was inexcusable at any level--except maybe at 10 year old recreational play--despite Bocanegra's belief that most players have been there.

Maybe Boca has, since he has a penchant for reckless fouls, but not in the box, and even Bornstein hasn't given up that foul--leaving his feet as a player is heading outside of the area. It's up to the player to have more composure and make a better decision.

The same can be said for the lack of intelligent tackling, spacing, and decision making.

There are few players I know that would willingly give up the ball to a central midfielder that tracks back within two to five yards of a non-pressured defender to request the ball. Most players would refuse to pass the ball to the midfielder (Bradley and Jones have both been guilty of this numerous times), wave them up the field to support an anemic attack, and, if they are not out-rightly insulted, tell the player to stop tracking back so far.

Oftentimes, a style of play, habits, technical ability or lack there of, and intelligence can't be fixed by a coach. There's only so much that can be done, and the players on the field need to resolve the issue or they lose.

Overall, the 2011 Gold Cup squad has issues. Thankfully, struggle and crisis tends to demand the best out of those willing to rise to the challenge. Hopefully, that's the case for this group.

Here are the cumulative player ratings for U.S. players that have seen the field so far:

GK, Tim Howard, 6: Howard backed up an amazing game against Canada with an awkward save in the Panama game that contributed to the goal. With a lack of further opportunities to improve on his performances, all that can be said is that he's done his job.

D, Steve Cherundolo, 7: Some might feel this rating is a little low. He's been the most consistent defender, shutting down his opposition, getting forward as much as possible, and has even taken on players.

There are a few things to keep in mind: As a veteran, he needs to be a stronger leader, also Guadeloupe and Canada were two of the teams the U.S. played so he should be able to contribute to the offense, and which U.S. player has gotten on the end of a Cherundolo cross?

Getting the ball into the area isn't the same as putting the ball on the head of an American forward. I know part of that responsibility falls on the attacker, but keep track of how many Cherundolo crosses never make it to an American body.

Still, he's been America's best defender so far.

D, Carlos Bocanegra, 6: A great stop-gap in the center of the defense for Bob Bradley. But, at this point in his career, he's clearly a limited player lacking agility and speed, foot skills or strong passing ability (he opts to play a long ball that usually ends up in turning possession over to the other team), and he probably won't be much help come 2014.

He better have a strong partner more adept at the physical demands of defense to compliment the experience and organization he brings to the back line.

Also, with Donovan and Dempsey wanting to move inside from the flanks, Bocanegra needs to add width to the attack, and he's not equipped to do so. He will not be an outside option for much longer.

D, Clarence Goodson, 5: One of the heir-apparents to a center back position, he's been struggling with strong, physical opponents (understandably considering how skinny he is), positioning, and unfortunately, not as talented with the ball at his feet as Tim Ream. T

his is an important tournament for Goodson. He needs to address his struggles and improve.

He's great in the air, scored a goal, and if he can address some of the drawbacks in his game, and perhaps, eat a cheeseburger (he needs to gain weight badly), the future of the U.S. central defense is his to lose after Ream's performance (Bradley didn't even include Ream on the bench for the Guadeloupe game).

D, Tim Ream, 2: At the beginning of the Panama game, the U.S. hadn't seen the level of composure, control, and distribution from U.S. center backs in a long, long time. Tim Ream was an important part of that display.

Then, it all fell apart. Goodson and Ream couldn't handle the physical, aggressive, and often times intelligent play of Panama's counter-attack. It culminated in Ream's ridiculous challenge.

It's not one single event that has hurt Ream, but how it all came together. He wasn't ready for the Panamanian attack, he didn't adjust, and he panicked. Ream shouldn't take all of the blame (no one helped him or the American cause that day), but because of the progression of events and his foul, he became the scapegoat.

It doesn't help that the move to put Bocanegra in the center worked out, and Goodson improved against Guadeloupe.

He's young. Hopefully he'll have a chance to redeem himself.

D, Eric Lichaj, 6.5: Played well against Guadeloupe, strong in challenges, good on the ball, and got forward as needed.

However, defensively, Lichaj lost his mark and was out of position a number of times. It didn't hurt him against Guadeloupe, but against a stronger forward, like Chicharito and the rest of the Mexican team, such defensive gaffs result in goals.

M, Clint Dempsey, 7.5: I've already talked at length about Dempsey. Best player on the team. His touch is impeccable. He's still getting better every game.

Some people may make a lot out of his late goal line mis-finish as well as his inability to convert his headers and other chances, but compared to whom?

When teams struggle, players try to do too much (like hold the ball too long). I think that's what we saw with Dempsey against Guadeloupe.

His role is also changing since he's now the go-to player for the U.S.without question. It will take him some time to adapt. His distribution needs to improve. If he can convert on some of his through balls to forwards, things could change dramatically. 

M, Michael Bradley, 5.5: Started out strong against Canada, mainly because he pushed up field and put himself in position to support the attack. This is especially impressive considering he had not had first team opportunities all club season. His passing improved as well.

But by the second game, Bradley was back to dropping deep and failing to be the transitional link and option in the attack.

Jones and Bradley have absolutely no chemistry, want to play the same position, and have settled for splitting the field in two. One has the right, the other the left, tentatively moving forward if the other drops deep, but ultimately waiting for the other to push forward, then immediately dropping back to fill the other's position.

It's as if there's an imaginary line in the offense where neither wants to move beyond.

The U.S. plays without a true central midfield attack. Stuart Holden is dearly missed. The question is whether Bradley, Jones, another player, perhaps from the bench, or Bob Bradley will fix this situation.

M, Jermaine Jones, 5: Most of what was said about Bradley can be said about Jones. He's a little better with the long ball than Bradley, but likes to go to it too much. Against better teams, will turning the ball over on such low percentage passes come back to hurt the team?

Both struggle to switch the field fast enough, pretend they're center backs (seriously, watch the next game, and notice how both drop within five yards of a defender even when the pass isn't needed, especially when another defender has vacated the space), and Jones didn't have the impact Bradley did against Canada.

Plus, Jones' undressing was unnecessary. He didn't need to strip off his shirt, even if it was in personal frustration rather than a slight against Bob Bradley. Jones has a reputation for being difficult. He doesn't need to feed it with gestures like that. It's distracting and not the type of display needed by the team right now.

Also, he is now the king of untimely tackles since Bradley has restrained himself and Bornstein isn't on the field. His foul partly caused the first goal against Panama. He needs to be more thoughtful with his physical play.

M, Landon Donovan, 5: If fans didn't know who Landon Donovan was, they wouldn't have been able to distinguish him from any other supporting player for the United States.

Like Dempsey, his role on the team is changing, but unlike Dempsey, he isn't adding to his game. Either he doesn't have the speed, or doesn't want to take on defenders any longer. He has the service, and he has proven he can make the right pass, so he has other skills.

Where are they?

Donovan may be at a critical point in his career. There may be few tangible skills he can add to his game, but he can still improve mentally. Beckham had to do it in order to stay relevant. Donovan can do it as well.

Even if he isn't plateauing, the team's changing, and he needs to adapt accordingly.

M, Alejandro Bedoya, 6: Along with Kljestan, has benefited the most from this tournament. He's done everything asked of him, played with energy and intelligence (even if he did dive), and should be given a larger role moving forward. His play has been better than Donovan's.

M, Sacha Klejstan, 6: What is it with American players not wanting to eat? When Sacha turns sideways, he can't be seen on the field. If the U.S. beats Jamaica, Goodson and Kljestan need to go out and have a steak dinner.

In all seriousness though, Kljestan and Bedoya give Bradley more options than he's willing to use. They have played competently, and Kljestan in particular can play a number of positions. He can pass, shoot, and handle the ball. In the few opportunities he's been given, he's played intelligently. With others struggling, should he be given more of a role?

M, Maurice Edu, N/A: Not enough time to really make a difference or get a good reading of his play. But he's been playing attacking mid at Rangers and played all season.  Bradley has to find a way to get him involved, even if it is off the bench (since he has not played well opposite Bradley or Jones when given the opportunity)

F, Juan Agudelo, 5: No longer the surprise to opponents he was before. This is part of growing as a player. Unfortunately, he doesn't get much help on the front line. Individually, Altidore's having a good tournament, but he's not the type of player that creates, which is where Agudelo shines...when he's able to play off of others.

F, Chris Wondolowski, 3: If Tim Ream is benched for his play against Panama, how is Wondolowski allowed back on the field after his three yard miss?

Right now, just about every American born soccer player is going, "I can get myself into a position like Wondolowski and fail to score. Why can't I play?"

Wondolowski was chosen because it was believed he might be able to finish chances. Presently, he's doing the opposite. If he doesn't change his performance soon, he might end up being the second coming of Taylor Twellman: strong in the MLS, unable to score regularly at the international level, and eventually being overlooked.

F, Jozy Altidore, 7: Lucky goal in the Canada game and an amazing strike against Guadeloupe.

For the Canada goal, he made the right run to get in position to have a look at goal and the strike was a precursor to the laser he struck against Guadeloupe.

Still, Jozy remains inconsistent. By the Panama game, he had stopped moving with any regularity and and once again failed to be a factor.

Jozy disappears for long stretches, goes down too easily (he's not going to get calls with any regularity because of his size), doesn't start or finish runs all the time, doesn't utilize his size and strength, and has a cheap and predictable bag of tricks most defenders have seen.

But he has scored two goals; currently, he's a contradiction.

Jozy has moments of brilliance, like his second goal, but then he appears lazy and unintelligent. So far, he's been an island. His individual contributions have earned him two goals on the stat sheet and the highlight reel, helped the team get out the group stage, but he remains out-of-sync with his other attackers.

He's at a crucial point in the tournament and his career. He knows he can score, now can he create for himself and for others with any consistency? We'll all get an opportunity to find out since there's no one to take his place.

Coach, Bob Bradley, 4: Right or wrong, when a team struggles, the coach takes the blame. The team's underperformed. It shouldn't have lost to Panama and should have beaten Guadeloupe by more.

As already mentioned, Bradley has options on his bench, his 4-4-2 isn't working against these opponents, and it's his responsibility to motivate and ensure players understand their roles. He's done little to improve his team's play.

Still, the team has advanced, done the bare minimum required (it's starting to be his M.O.), and even substituted his son late in the Guadeloupe game.

In the end though, the team isn't where it needs to be, and that's why there's talk of sacking him. Still, Bradley has at least one chance to fix things...the Jamaica game.

Hopefully, he'll be able to.

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Naturally, this wasn't Rongen's wish, and he told ESPN.com that he had stated his case for the continuance of his position as manager of the U-20's. He cited stability and recruiting success as major reasons for contract renewal.

Rongen hinted that the USSF weighed a strong winning record over recruiting prowess, and with his team's failure to qualify for the U-20 World Cup, there was little chance he would receive a new contract.

Success with any U-20 national team is difficult, and it is impressive that he managed to keep that position for nine years (with a small stint at Chivas USA).

Most likely, Rongen kept his position because he discovered a number of young players with outstanding potential—players like Clint Dempsey and Stuart Holden.

In fact, his latest group was labeled as his most talented to date.

But his ability to recruit such players was his downfall. With more skill in his side came greater expectations, and finally, he couldn't live up to the hype.

There were flaws to Rongen's philosophy, and perhaps that's the best defense the USSF can claim for Rongen's dismissal.

Rongen searched far and wide for his players, and while he expanded the breadth and talent of the U.S. player pool, his desire to assess as many players as possible left his core group with little time to practice together.

A number of his teams have appeared disjointed, lacking the strong chemistry, confidence, and team philosophy necessary to succeed at the international level—at any age.

Once one considers the importance of instilling a national philosophy, especially in the U-20's since they will become the newest members of the senior side, Rongen's managerial shortcomings become dangerous holes in a national program.

It was more likely the lack of an overall improved, attractive youth system that ended Rongen's reign rather than the results of one game (Rongen alluded to results, in particular the Guatemala game, as the major factor in the federation's decision).

Also, the federation's recent release of its top-level youth development guidelines spearheaded by Claudio Reyna may have also played into the decision. The federation may be looking for a manager with a more intensive, consistent, rather than expansive, approach in order to support this program.

That doesn't mean Rongen should be left out in the cold.

There's something to be said for a broad, sophisticated, inviting and philosophically-focused development program. Germany's run at the World Cup proves the importance of such a nationally organized program.

And the United States desperately needs that system.

Jurgen Klinsman's indictment of the youth system in America: disjointed, pay-to-play and out of touch with the rest of the world wasn't out of line, and perhaps, a position for someone of Rongen's skill set, someone who has a passion for young players, searching and finding them in the most unlikely of places, is the first step in fixing the U.S. developmental system.

Outside of his coaching foibles, the biggest criticism against him is Neven Subotic.

Now a Serbian international, Subotic had the opportunity to play for the United States but opted for the Eastern European country because of a strained relationship with the U.S. youth teams and coaches—Rongen included.

The problem revolved around publicly stated remarks from Rongen about Subotic's performance for the U-20 team, but again, this issue has more to do with a coaching than recruiting, and shouldn't be an issue if Rongen ends up holding a different position.

Some real good could come out of this shakeup. The U-20 team needs a coach that gets more out of its team, tactically and technically, but even more so, the youth levels need a more inclusive, unified plan.

Yes, some players develop a little later than others, but senior manager Bob Bradley has been in the recent practice of calling up first-time foreign based players with dual citizenship for international friendlies, and this shouldn't have to happen.

These players should already be in the system and given opportunities to shine, or at least familiarize themselves with current U.S. tactics, technical expectations, and speed of play at the international level for their age groups (Note:  Rongen did catch some. Current senior call up Mikkel Diskerud was courted by him)..

On a secondary note, the national team landscape is changing quickly. Early on, it was more beneficial for the federation to pick out what they believed to be the most talented players, coddle, develop and spend most of their resources on these players.

This practice started with Eric Wynalda and John Harkes but was still in place by the time of Freddy Adu, Eddie Johnson and Eddie Gaven came along.

While spending the majority of a federation's resources on a choice few was the right choice in the early late 80's and early 90's, now that the U.S. player pool has expanded and the average skill level of said pool player is that of an MLS starter, there's little need to cultivate a choice few.

Instead, the federation needs to include as many players as possible, foster positive competition and see who rises to the top. But, of course, that means the USSF needs to coordinate with the MLS and stay in constant communication with foreign-based players—a difficult task with so many moving parts.

Some players will be overlooked, others offended, and others included that end up failing, but there won't be the pressure to have certain players workout because of the money, time and resources spent on them. Hopefully there will be a decrease in the obvious favoritism that has resulted from a little too much familiarity between some players and coaches.

If Rongen is given a senior position in identification and recruitment, then his dismissal could be a blessing in disguise.

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Here's a look at the last 10 years' worth of winners and runners-up from the U-20 World Cup:

Egypt 2009

Winner: Ghana

Runner Up: Brazil

Canada 2007

Winner: Argentina

Runner Up: Czech Republic

Netherlands 2005

Winner: Argentina

Runner Up: Nigeria

UAE 2003

Winner: Brazil

Runner Up: Spain

Argentina 2001

Winner: Argentina

Runner Up: Ghana

Nigeria 1999

Winner: Spain

Runner Up: Japan

If the winners or runners-up were used as any indication of how the future soccer powers of the world would look, then Argentina and Spain would be the favorites with Brazil as a close second (seems to be the nature of things), and Ghana should have won a World Cup for Africa by now (Why hasn't that happened?).

Perhaps the only bit of insight that can be gained from the U-20 tournament is Ghana's world-class status, but any fan that watched the England/Ghana friendly a week ago could have come to the same conclusion.

Ghana's good.

They're better than the media or fans ever gave them credit for, but if one would have looked at the club pedigree, at least 10 players are playing at European clubs, if not top-flight clubs. Add to that a strong coach with tactics that favored the team's strength, and there's no reason not to consider Ghana a dangerous side.

Still, that could have been discerned without a U-20 World Cup. These players were picked up at an early age by clubs that recognized their talent.

Then maybe the U-20 World Cup is the coming-out party for star players on the international scene. Javier Saviola, Sergio Aguero and Lionel Messi have all won the Golden Ball and Golden Shoe.

Domnic Adiyiah (of Ghana fame, but currently playing for Partizan in Serbia, on loan from AC Milan; also, originally picked up by Feyenoord at age 10, thereby already recognized as talented before the U-20 tournament) has won both as well, and Eddie Johnson has won the Golden Shoe.

Is the U-20 tournament a realistic glimpse into the careers of tomorrow's stars?

If not, then what can be learned from the U.S. not qualifying for the U-20 tournament? This question was brought to Grant Wahl in his soccer mailbag at si.com, but this isn't a new concern or question.

As far back as 1994, there were always rumors of the young teams fairing well in these tournaments and how these new teams (in particular African teams) were heralding a change in the international football landscape.

But what has actually changed in all that time?

As of 2010, there's one new addition to the World Cup winners...not from Africa...but from a European country with a Golden Generation, a premier league and a strong youth-focused infrastructure (that much can be gleaned from the U-20 records. The same holds for the youth of Argentina and Brazil).

Grant Wahl hinted at this in his response, wanting to focus more on the overall American landscape of youth development and how there are few young players ready to replace Landon Donovan or Clint Dempsey.

Disregarding the absurd in his comments—Donovan and Dempsey are arguably in their prime and still improving—who could usurp their place on the American side? Not to mention, American players tend to peak later than most as most lack the experience necessary to compete with the best on the international stage; it's not by accident that players, coaches and analysts all comment on the dramatic increase in speed at the top level, and therefore, it takes a little more time for American players to evolve—the U-20 tournament is really a showcase for FIFA in order to make money and advertise their product.

The aberrations in the final participants should be the first indication that the tournament is an unreliable predictor of future success.

Maturity, club soccer and the senior squad all skew the impact of these youth tournaments.

Yes, Lionel Messi played for his U-20 squad, but what about two England players that were hailed as stars in their youth: Wayne Rooney and Michael Owen? Rooney played one game for the U-19 squad and Owen, four, for the U-20's, yet both logged significant minutes for their senior side(70 and 89 starts respectively).

Notice, both Argentina and England have not won the World Cup in recent years with the former doing well at the U-20 tournament and the latter, not so much. Lionel Messi is arguably the best player in the world, and Wayne Rooney is not that far behind him, different routes, same outcome.

Messi came along during a time when his national side was stacked with talent, especially up front (he would eventually make the senior team for the 2006 World Cup), but was over shadowed by Carlos Tevez, Hernan Crespo and Juan Roman Riquelme.

At 18, Messi wasn't at a point in his career to usurp such excellent players, so obviously, Messi would have more opportunities to shine at the youth tournament.

England, however, needed another goal-scorer as Michael Owen was injury prone and Emile Heskey has his difficulty finding the net from time to time; the opportunity was there for Rooney, not so much for Messi.

With so many variables, youth tournaments need to be taken with a grain of salt, especially for the United States.

The American side oftentimes overachieves, a sum total usually better than its individual parts—which may not always be said for Argentina, Brazil or England. 

Also, young American players tend to lack the experience and chemistry needed to add to such a team, and this may be why a number of U.S. managers return to their "comfortable" and "favored" players even after they've exceeded their use-by date.

Club play is difficult for most American players.

The MLS season runs opposite the European and international calendar. Players must find a way to the more competitive European leagues, and this tends to take a little more time. The domestic league isn't as developed as the Brazilian and Argentinian leagues, so it takes Americans more time to succeed at the international level.

But that doesn't mean the U.S. national side doesn't win.

U.S. soccer needs to address what these youth players need and are learning at the tournaments and if this is the best choice for development. Many of these players end up competing in the MLS, but few are making the transition to the next level.

There's still no American superstar forward nor midfield playmaker.

There's a slew of role players, but many U.S. pool players can play a role without getting a tremendous amount of international playing time at the youth level. College soccer and the MLS are decent enough to develop this level of talent.

What does the U.S. need to do in order to facilitate a player's transition to high-level European soccer? Messi, Rooney and a host of other international players continue to develop. Why are Americans stalling?

Is it coaching? Maybe poor career choices? There may be as many variables as there are with the U-20 tournament, but clearly, something is wrong.

Winning the youth tournaments isn't important. The tournaments aren't a barometer of anything in particular, but the lack of high-profile transfer fee or club signing for an American is.

The focus needs to be on the inability for the U.S. to develop its potential stars after a certain point, not what was the score of that kindergarten friendly last week.

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Here's a look at the last 10 years' worth of winners and runners-up from the U-20 World Cup:

Egypt 2009

Winner: Ghana

Runner Up: Brazil

Canada 2007

Winner: Argentina

Runner Up: Czech Republic

Netherlands 2005

Winner: Argentina

Runner Up: Nigeria

UAE 2003

Winner: Brazil

Runner Up: Spain

Argentina 2001

Winner: Argentina

Runner Up: Ghana

Nigeria 1999

Winner: Spain

Runner Up: Japan

If the winners or runners-up were used as any indication of how the future soccer powers of the world would look, then Argentina and Spain would be the favorites with Brazil as a close second (seems to be the nature of things), and Ghana should have won a World Cup for Africa by now (Why hasn't that happened?).

Perhaps the only bit of insight that can be gained from the U-20 tournament is Ghana's world-class status, but any fan that watched the England/Ghana friendly a week ago could have come to the same conclusion.

Ghana's good.

They're better than the media or fans ever gave them credit for, but if one would have looked at the club pedigree, at least 10 players are playing at European clubs, if not top-flight clubs. Add to that a strong coach with tactics that favored the team's strength, and there's no reason not to consider Ghana a dangerous side.

Still, that could have been discerned without a U-20 World Cup. These players were picked up at an early age by clubs that recognized their talent.

Then maybe the U-20 World Cup is the coming-out party for star players on the international scene. Javier Saviola, Sergio Aguero and Lionel Messi have all won the Golden Ball and Golden Shoe.

Domnic Adiyiah (of Ghana fame, but currently playing for Partizan in Serbia, on loan from AC Milan; also, originally picked up by Feyenoord at age 10, thereby already recognized as talented before the U-20 tournament) has won both as well, and Eddie Johnson has won the Golden Shoe.

Is the U-20 tournament a realistic glimpse into the careers of tomorrow's stars?

If not, then what can be learned from the U.S. not qualifying for the U-20 tournament? This question was brought to Grant Wahl in his soccer mailbag at si.com, but this isn't a new concern or question.

As far back as 1994, there were always rumors of the young teams fairing well in these tournaments and how these new teams (in particular African teams) were heralding a change in the international football landscape.

But what has actually changed in all that time?

As of 2010, there's one new addition to the World Cup winners...not from Africa...but from a European country with a Golden Generation, a premier league and a strong youth-focused infrastructure (that much can be gleaned from the U-20 records. The same holds for the youth of Argentina and Brazil).

Grant Wahl hinted at this in his response, wanting to focus more on the overall American landscape of youth development and how there are few young players ready to replace Landon Donovan or Clint Dempsey.

Disregarding the absurd in his comments—Donovan and Dempsey are arguably in their prime and still improving—who could usurp their place on the American side? Not to mention, American players tend to peak later than most as most lack the experience necessary to compete with the best on the international stage; it's not by accident that players, coaches and analysts all comment on the dramatic increase in speed at the top level, and therefore, it takes a little more time for American players to evolve—the U-20 tournament is really a showcase for FIFA in order to make money and advertise their product.

The aberrations in the final participants should be the first indication that the tournament is an unreliable predictor of future success.

Maturity, club soccer and the senior squad all skew the impact of these youth tournaments.

Yes, Lionel Messi played for his U-20 squad, but what about two England players that were hailed as stars in their youth: Wayne Rooney and Michael Owen? Rooney played one game for the U-19 squad and Owen, four, for the U-20's, yet both logged significant minutes for their senior side(70 and 89 starts respectively).

Notice, both Argentina and England have not won the World Cup in recent years with the former doing well at the U-20 tournament and the latter, not so much. Lionel Messi is arguably the best player in the world, and Wayne Rooney is not that far behind him, different routes, same outcome.

Messi came along during a time when his national side was stacked with talent, especially up front (he would eventually make the senior team for the 2006 World Cup), but was over shadowed by Carlos Tevez, Hernan Crespo and Juan Roman Riquelme.

At 18, Messi wasn't at a point in his career to usurp such excellent players, so obviously, Messi would have more opportunities to shine at the youth tournament.

England, however, needed another goal-scorer as Michael Owen was injury prone and Emile Heskey has his difficulty finding the net from time to time; the opportunity was there for Rooney, not so much for Messi.

With so many variables, youth tournaments need to be taken with a grain of salt, especially for the United States.

The American side oftentimes overachieves, a sum total usually better than its individual parts—which may not always be said for Argentina, Brazil or England. 

Also, young American players tend to lack the experience and chemistry needed to add to such a team, and this may be why a number of U.S. managers return to their "comfortable" and "favored" players even after they've exceeded their use-by date.

Club play is difficult for most American players.

The MLS season runs opposite the European and international calendar. Players must find a way to the more competitive European leagues, and this tends to take a little more time. The domestic league isn't as developed as the Brazilian and Argentinian leagues, so it takes Americans more time to succeed at the international level.

But that doesn't mean the U.S. national side doesn't win.

U.S. soccer needs to address what these youth players need and are learning at the tournaments and if this is the best choice for development. Many of these players end up competing in the MLS, but few are making the transition to the next level.

There's still no American superstar forward nor midfield playmaker.

There's a slew of role players, but many U.S. pool players can play a role without getting a tremendous amount of international playing time at the youth level. College soccer and the MLS are decent enough to develop this level of talent.

What does the U.S. need to do in order to facilitate a player's transition to high-level European soccer? Messi, Rooney and a host of other international players continue to develop. Why are Americans stalling?

Is it coaching? Maybe poor career choices? There may be as many variables as there are with the U-20 tournament, but clearly, something is wrong.

Winning the youth tournaments isn't important. The tournaments aren't a barometer of anything in particular, but the lack of high-profile transfer fee or club signing for an American is.

The focus needs to be on the inability for the U.S. to develop its potential stars after a certain point, not what was the score of that kindergarten friendly last week.

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Here's a look at the last 10 years' worth of winners and runners-up from the U-20 World Cup:

Egypt 2009

Winner: Ghana

Runner Up: Brazil

Canada 2007

Winner: Argentina

Runner Up: Czech Republic

Netherlands 2005

Winner: Argentina

Runner Up: Nigeria

UAE 2003

Winner: Brazil

Runner Up: Spain

Argentina 2001

Winner: Argentina

Runner Up: Ghana

Nigeria 1999

Winner: Spain

Runner Up: Japan

If the winners or runners-up were used as any indication of how the future soccer powers of the world would look, then Argentina and Spain would be the favorites with Brazil as a close second (seems to be the nature of things), and Ghana should have won a World Cup for Africa by now (Why hasn't that happened?).

Perhaps the only bit of insight that can be gained from the U-20 tournament is Ghana's world-class status, but any fan that watched the England/Ghana friendly a week ago could have come to the same conclusion.

Ghana's good.

They're better than the media or fans ever gave them credit for, but if one would have looked at the club pedigree, at least 10 players are playing at European clubs, if not top-flight clubs. Add to that a strong coach with tactics that favored the team's strength, and there's no reason not to consider Ghana a dangerous side.

Still, that could have been discerned without a U-20 World Cup. These players were picked up at an early age by clubs that recognized their talent.

Then maybe the U-20 World Cup is the coming-out party for star players on the international scene. Javier Saviola, Sergio Aguero and Lionel Messi have all won the Golden Ball and Golden Shoe.

Domnic Adiyiah (of Ghana fame, but currently playing for Partizan in Serbia, on loan from AC Milan; also, originally picked up by Feyenoord at age 10, thereby already recognized as talented before the U-20 tournament) has won both as well, and Eddie Johnson has won the Golden Shoe.

Is the U-20 tournament a realistic glimpse into the careers of tomorrow's stars?

If not, then what can be learned from the U.S. not qualifying for the U-20 tournament? This question was brought to Grant Wahl in his soccer mailbag at si.com, but this isn't a new concern or question.

As far back as 1994, there were always rumors of the young teams fairing well in these tournaments and how these new teams (in particular African teams) were heralding a change in the international football landscape.

But what has actually changed in all that time?

As of 2010, there's one new addition to the World Cup winners...not from Africa...but from a European country with a Golden Generation, a premier league and a strong youth-focused infrastructure (that much can be gleaned from the U-20 records. The same holds for the youth of Argentina and Brazil).

Grant Wahl hinted at this in his response, wanting to focus more on the overall American landscape of youth development and how there are few young players ready to replace Landon Donovan or Clint Dempsey.

Disregarding the absurd in his comments—Donovan and Dempsey are arguably in their prime and still improving—who could usurp their place on the American side? Not to mention, American players tend to peak later than most as most lack the experience necessary to compete with the best on the international stage; it's not by accident that players, coaches and analysts all comment on the dramatic increase in speed at the top level, and therefore, it takes a little more time for American players to evolve—the U-20 tournament is really a showcase for FIFA in order to make money and advertise their product.

The aberrations in the final participants should be the first indication that the tournament is an unreliable predictor of future success.

Maturity, club soccer and the senior squad all skew the impact of these youth tournaments.

Yes, Lionel Messi played for his U-20 squad, but what about two England players that were hailed as stars in their youth: Wayne Rooney and Michael Owen? Rooney played one game for the U-19 squad and Owen, four, for the U-20's, yet both logged significant minutes for their senior side(70 and 89 starts respectively).

Notice, both Argentina and England have not won the World Cup in recent years with the former doing well at the U-20 tournament and the latter, not so much. Lionel Messi is arguably the best player in the world, and Wayne Rooney is not that far behind him, different routes, same outcome.

Messi came along during a time when his national side was stacked with talent, especially up front (he would eventually make the senior team for the 2006 World Cup), but was over shadowed by Carlos Tevez, Hernan Crespo and Juan Roman Riquelme.

At 18, Messi wasn't at a point in his career to usurp such excellent players, so obviously, Messi would have more opportunities to shine at the youth tournament.

England, however, needed another goal-scorer as Michael Owen was injury prone and Emile Heskey has his difficulty finding the net from time to time; the opportunity was there for Rooney, not so much for Messi.

With so many variables, youth tournaments need to be taken with a grain of salt, especially for the United States.

The American side oftentimes overachieves, a sum total usually better than its individual parts—which may not always be said for Argentina, Brazil or England. 

Also, young American players tend to lack the experience and chemistry needed to add to such a team, and this may be why a number of U.S. managers return to their "comfortable" and "favored" players even after they've exceeded their use-by date.

Club play is difficult for most American players.

The MLS season runs opposite the European and international calendar. Players must find a way to the more competitive European leagues, and this tends to take a little more time. The domestic league isn't as developed as the Brazilian and Argentinian leagues, so it takes Americans more time to succeed at the international level.

But that doesn't mean the U.S. national side doesn't win.

U.S. soccer needs to address what these youth players need and are learning at the tournaments and if this is the best choice for development. Many of these players end up competing in the MLS, but few are making the transition to the next level.

There's still no American superstar forward nor midfield playmaker.

There's a slew of role players, but many U.S. pool players can play a role without getting a tremendous amount of international playing time at the youth level. College soccer and the MLS are decent enough to develop this level of talent.

What does the U.S. need to do in order to facilitate a player's transition to high-level European soccer? Messi, Rooney and a host of other international players continue to develop. Why are Americans stalling?

Is it coaching? Maybe poor career choices? There may be as many variables as there are with the U-20 tournament, but clearly, something is wrong.

Winning the youth tournaments isn't important. The tournaments aren't a barometer of anything in particular, but the lack of high-profile transfer fee or club signing for an American is.

The focus needs to be on the inability for the U.S. to develop its potential stars after a certain point, not what was the score of that kindergarten friendly last week.

Read more International Football news on BleacherReport.com

A number of analysts felt the United States needed to assert a presence for 90 minutes, something that they did not nor could not accomplish against Argentina.

The game had more of a CONCACAF feel: disruptive, disjointed and ugly.

Paraguay picked up an early goal on a corner where both central defenders fell out of the play after early contact on the kick. However, the goal happened in the first half, and the U.S. had more than its share of opportunities to tie once again.

While younger players shined, the veterans (barring a few exceptions) did not execute, and the one-goal deficit was enough for Paraguay.

The U.S. had an opportunity to work on its 4-4-2 formation, improving its chemistry and play.

Bradley was even willing to work with different combinations of players, having the opportunity to keep the focus on Donovan and Dempsey (the core of any U.S. offense) late in the game just in case he needed an alternative for Jozy Alitdore and Juan Agudelo.

Unlike the Argentina game, there were no late-game heroes.

The United States lived up to its most significant fault: the inability to score goals.

Paraguay played a stringent and frustrating defense—a defense other teams will emulate if the U.S. goes down a goal in the Gold Cup.

Bob Bradley may be pleased with his young players in this contest, but even as the American player pool can replenish its supporting cast, the problems still remain the same: If the ball doesn't find its way into the net, then the U.S. can't win.

Player Rankings

GK, Marcus Hahnemann: 4

Others might give Hahnemann a better rating, but he could have saved the goal. Should he have saved it? No—but that's the difference.

Hahnemann has always been the backup because he's a routine shot stopper. The great goalkeepers (a la Tim Howard on Saturday) stop the shots you're not supposed to. The U.S. has had a tradition of great goalies; the same needs to be expected of the backup.

D, Jonathan Bornstein: 4

Just because you get up the field doesn't mean you deserve accolades. Dempsey gave Bornstein plenty of room, especially since no one pressed the space on Bornstein's side.

At the international level it's not good enough to get into space; players must execute. Bornstein can't execute. He never could.

A left-sided player hasn't emerged, and that's why there hasn't been a replacement for him. Bocanegra will play here in the big games.

D, Tim Ream: 5

Really wanted to give Ream a higher ranking. He has much more control on the ball than any other central back being considered; add to that his poise and young age, and his performance is noteworthy.

But here's the difference: International defenders (especially in Europe) do what Tim Ream has done every day. The next step is for the youngster to assert his influence in the back in a way reminiscent of Onyewu before his injury (think a poor man's Nemanja Vidic for Manchester United).

D, Jay DeMerit: 4

A difficult goal and an early night because of injury, but at the start of the game as the United States tried to create flow and a tempo to the game, his on-the-ball skills came up lacking.

The backs failed on the goal all together (something rarely seen by the American side). Still, DeMerit will not be a starter in four years—if he is, the U.S. is in trouble.

D/M, Timothy Chandler: 7

One of the best additions to the U.S. team. He gets up the field well, his crosses are in play (Jonathan Bornstein and Carlos Bocanegra need to take notes) and his speed makes him dangerous on offense and on defense (he recovers quickly). He interacts well with the attackers.

Chandler played himself into contention for a spot in this year's Gold Cup.

M, Clint Dempsey: 6

The goal is to get Dempsey and Donovan on the ball; that's exactly what happened in this game. For Dempsey, it's clear he did the work to get open, moving all over the midfield. He trusted his left back to cover for him (a big risk considering its Bornstein), but it paid off, as Dempsey was more of an influence in the game.

This is the goal for the U.S. attack. If Dempsey and Donovan aren't influential, then the U.S. struggles. Dempsey did his part.

Did he hold the ball up at times when he should have played quicker? Maybe—but at some point, the rest of the team must adapt to the best players. It's time for the U.S. to play off of Dempsey.

The U.S. struggles in this department in general. When Mikkel Diskeruud took extra touches in his last game, the other players did not know how to adapt to a player that can hold onto the ball.

M, Michael Bradley: 4

Started off strong and had a great shot late in the game, but what else did he do?

Bradley's moments of brilliance earn him respect beyond the simpler and quieter parts of a successful midfield performance. Let's start with decent passing.

Bradley's best passes were drop passes. With more sophisticated teams (and passing stats), these are thrown out as the player is relinquishing offensive influence to another player.

It's not all Bradley's fault. It's clear there's confusion as to midfield responsibilities between him, Edu and Jones. They all play in each other's place and want to inhabit the same roles.

By the time Sacha Kljestan came on, I was hoping he was taking a central midfield spot in order to add a new look. Losing Stuart Holden hurts more than can be expressed.

Note: Bradley hasn't been subbed in a game since before the World Cup. There are games when he has warranted a substitution. It's time to keep track of minutes. Jermaine Jones could have taken his place and Mikkel Diskeruud for Edu. Even if it's not overt favoritism, it needs to be addressed.

M, Maurice Edu: 3

The biggest difference between this game and Argentina is the lack of distinct positioning between Edu and Bradley. One of the benefits of Edu playing farther up the field in the Argentina game was the inclination to play there when the formation changed.

In the Paraguay game, Edu played a more horizontal partner to Bradley. In essence, they played the same role and covered the same space. This hurt the U.S. and has been a problem for some time now.

It's time for coaching to fix this issue. Play a diamond; work on positioning in practice. Otherwise, the central midfield is a disaster. It doesn't matter who plays there.

M, Landon Donovan: 4

How Donovan plays—more specifically, if he can or can't execute on offense—directly affects how the U.S. plays. Donovan couldn't pass tonight. He had too many interceptions, and his service on free kicks was unacceptable.

This is not the first time Donovan has had a poor time with his service. He went through a tough spell before the World Cup. He needs to recognize his struggles and let someone else take the kick (just not Michael Bradley—his service on his one kick was just as ineffectual).

His missed volley summed up his night; sometimes, the ball doesn't end up in the net. Unfortunately for the U.S., when Donovan can't score, the U.S. rarely wins.

F, Jozy Alitdore: 4

He looked great in the second half of the Argentina friendly, with great touches and combinations, but what happens when the partnership isn't working that way?

Altidore is quickly turning into Brian Ching; he's a player that gets the ball and does little with it. His failure to execute caused the change in formation (at some point, there needed to be a different formation; remember the troubles after Davies was injured). Still, his future is safe until a replacement can be found, and there isn't one yet.

But Charlie Davies has scored a couple of goals in the same league with Agudelo.

F, Juan Agudelo: 7

In a stingy game, strength on the ball and timely fouls control the pace, space and possession in a game. Agudelo did his job. Unlucky on a non-called penalty he created by himself, but with the amount of set pieces either he or Dempsey created, the U.S. should have scored.

He did his part and earned his way into the Gold Cup squad. An impressive display for an 18-year-old.

Substitutes

D, Carlos Bocanegra: 5

Only garnered this high of a ranking because he was coming on after the flow and pace had already been dictated, and it wasn't in the 60-80 minute range when substitutes can put more of an imprint on the game. He had to adapt quickly and shut down fresh attackers. Boca has been here before, and he did a comparable job to DeMerit.

In the second half, his inability to hit a decent cross really hurt his game. Like Bornstein, when he gets up the field, he needs to execute.

In fact, his inability on the cross really changes the U.S. attack. Maybe it should move to a hybrid three-back system with the right-sided back pushing extremely high since he's much stronger on defense than on offense (and then only pushing forward on set pieces where he's so much more effective).

M, Jermaine Jones: 4

Again, one shot does not make a ranking.

Jones' passes were erratic. He spent too much time playing on top of his defenders (something all of the central midfielders have been guilty of) and didn't look to push forward.

Jones offered nothing that Bradley and Edu don't already do, and that a slew of MLS holding midfielders do as well. His frustrated collapse at the final whistle did not translate in fan support based on his performance.

D, Erich Lichaj: 6

Strong defensive play, and he was a great partner for Timothy Chandler. The right side of the defense is secure. He gets forward well—not quite as well as Chandler, but good enough. Lichaj needs to secure club team playing time, but Cherundolo's replacements are ready.

M, Jonathan Spector: 5

Unfortunately, the ways in which Spector can help an American squad (as a utility player) aren't currently needed. He really can't play from start to finish, and certainly not in the back, but he did a fine job as a substitute in the midfield, much in the same way he does for West Ham.

But that's not what the U.S. needs. It needs players that offer a new look to a predictable 4-4-2. A decent national team pool player, but he may not make a Gold Cup squad; specialization might trump utility.

M, Sacha Kljestan: N/A

Sure, he had a decent amount of time on the field, but he didn't add much to the game, hence the N/A score. The game didn't play his way.

Yes, he had a couple of combos and an early cross, but they came to naught. He did nothing to hurt the game, but nothing to add to it as well.

GK, David Yelldell: N/A

Played a whole half, but had no impact on the game. Yes, he had an amazing shot to defend, but there was nothing he could do on it; luckily, the post saved the day. The goal was out of his hands—much like the scoreline.

Overall, Bradley should be pleased with the progress his youth players have made. They can easily replace aging players, especially Chandler, Lichaj and Ream. All three have played more than once and have done well.

Agudelo is a great find and he will be an exciting addition to the squad.

Still, the inability to score—especially from the run of play—and the trend that "how Donovan plays is how the U.S. fairs" are problems needing a remedy.

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The Argentinian side dominated the first half, and truly there wasn't a single U.S. player that stood out.

But how could any when the formation and strategy was exactly what Argentina would want:  Drop deep, absorb pressure, let Messi and Co. run at us, hope for a counter-attack with a lone striker.

Could the South Americans ask for anything better?

They learned one lesson from the first half: the United States can organize itself (and thank goodness, since its an international team); it can let in only one goal when playing its traditional "shell defense"; and yes, Argentina is very good.

That's is a great lesson to learn if the goal of the match is to only lose by one goal. Unfortunately, that's rarely the case at the international level.

Still, the American side redeemed itself in the second half.

Bob Bradley changed the formation to a more conventional 4-4-2 (something this writer expected as it is the best formation for this U.S squad), and the United States pressed its attack which is really the only option against a side as strong and inventive on the ball as Argentina.

The change led to a set piece (still the best chance for the U.S. to score a goal), and Juan Agudelo scored a second chance rebound (Charlie Davies-esque). A decent defensive effort and wonderful goalkeeping by Tim Howard earned the U.S. a tie for a great second half effort. 

Here are my player rankings:

Tim Howard—9: Performances like this game are why so many American fans consider Howard one of the best goal keepers in the world. His display was as good as any and the type necessary to win a tournament. He made no mistakes and could do nothing on the goal. A great performance after a quiet World Cup.

Carlos Bocanegra—6: Struggled late, but was the strongest performer out of the defensive starters. Boca lacks a first step and if most attackers don't realize it right away, they figure it out by the end of the first half.

Tim Howard was all over him when he was beaten inside for shots, but he did not commit a major gaffe (Messi's pass through his legs was less his fault and more Messi's talent). Furthermore, without an heir apparent, he's the only choice at left back even as he ages, especially if he can continue make an impact on set pieces (like he did on Agudelo's goal.)

Jay DeMerit—3: Nights like tonight are why the blond defender returned to the MLS. He was beaten by simple feints and over-committed too many times against elite attackers. DeMerit has to be on his best game to compete at this level. Game-shape or not, he made Argentina's forward line look twice as good as they are (and they are already excellent) by being unable to anticipate give-and-goes, overlaps or drop passes. The U.S. has to have smarter options in the middle.

Oguiche Onyewu—4: There's a chance that Onyewu may never reach the form he exhibited before his injury. Gooch was never a presence in the back, didn't organize or command the back line—and when he had the ball, he gave up possession. Nine times out of ten he cleared the ball as far as possible.

With the U.S. under pressure, those decisions only hurt the cause. Bradley may need to promote a new center back if he hopes to strengthen and reinvigorate his back line. There needs to be more intelligence and leadership in the middle.

Jonathan Spector—4: It was going to be interesting to see how Spector handled right back with intermittent playing time at Aston Villa. The U.S. played so defensively in the first half he had few opportunities to get up field. Still, like DeMerit, he was always on his heels, and outside of a few blocks, had a disappointing outing. With the likes of Chandler and Lichaj, Spector may see limited time as the U.S. moves forward.

Jermaine Jones—4: Jones' grade could be worse, but he's being given the benefit of the doubt because of the defensive strategy employed in the first half. Nevertheless, he made little impact on either side of the ball, made a poor, frustrated tackle that could have been a yellow card (a Jones' tendency), and there was no evidence of the potential he displayed on his debut. It's clear Jones does not play well in a condensed midfield, nor next to Bradley. With such a problem, it will be interesting to see how he will be used going forward.

Michael Bradley—5: Never a Bradley fan myself, but this was one of his better displays. He stayed home and adhered to the plan. He relinquished most of his passing duties to Edu—an intelligent choice—but his uncontrollable moments (running at attacking players full speed) happened too often, and of course, talented ball-handlers (a la those on Argentina), proceeded to dribble around him.

Getting beat on a playground 360 by Messi didn't help either. There's a reason why Bradley isn't starting for Villa; he's a limited player. As a holding midfielder, when the ball falls to him, he needs to execute perfectly. Usually that means finding the right pass, and this is something he struggles with, but is there a better option?

Maurice Edu—5: Nonexistent in the first half, but excluding Tim Howard, so was the whole team. He played much better in the second, though. Edu and Bradley seemed to have cleared up some of their chemistry problems from earlier outings. Great offensive support and good cover when needed on defense.

However, if he's going to be the offensive link ensuring that Donovan and Dempsey get the ball, he needs to relieve pressure by keeping possession, make timely passes, and get the team out of trouble with creativity: especially if the U.S. continues to play in a 4-4-2. But he'll never live up to the expectations.

What was once believed to be the U.S. strength, the central midfield, may be the most difficult to fill. The team clearly needs to play with two attackers, and that means removing a midfielder. With Dempsey, Donovan and a holding midfielder taking up three positions, the last midfielder is going to have to be a well-rounded candidate. Few current American midfielders fit that bill.

Clint Dempsey—5: Some will be critical of his quiet night and bad back-heel giveaway, but he was smart on the ball most of the night, contributed defensively, and supported the attack. Lack of service hampered his game.

If Bradley can find a central midfield tandem that can cover the defense and get the ball to him, then fans will see more from the Texan.

Landon Donovan—5: Like Dempsey, there was not much he could do without the ball. He made the right passes and upheld his defensive responsibilities. He could have executed a little better on a couple of attacks, but until he gets more help and has more freedom, not much more can be expected of him.

Jozy Altidore—5: It's not Jozy's fault that he struggled in the first half. With the type of game Bob Bradley wanted to play, he had no business being on the field. The goal isn't for a lone striker with ten men behind the ball to hold the ball up. He has to do exactly what he tried—to attack the defense. But that's not who he is, nor his type of game.

Altidore's not fast, nor technically blessed enough to play the lone striker role in a bunker defense. It's clear he needs a partner. Tonight he showed he can play when he has less pressure and less responsibility on his shoulders. It was good to see how he can be utilized by this team. His performance alongside Agudelo has potential.

Substitutes:

Timothy Chandler—6.5: Speed: it's Chandler's greatest asset. He was able to get forward with it and back on defense when beaten. Without his crosses and addition in the attack, the U.S. doesn't pin in Argentina's back and change the flow of the game.

Chandler is America's version of the modern outside back, a player able to get forward, decent on the ball and with service, and he can make up for defensive lapses by tracking back and recovering in a timely fashion. Fans can expect to see more of him.

Juan Agudelo—8: Some may think this rating is over-generous or has to do with the hype. Three reasons for an eight instead of a seven: he's eighteen and playing Argentina; he brought out the best in Altidore; and he brings energy, speed, and a calmness on the ball the forward line hasn't seen since the pre-injury Charlie Davies.

He may have been overzealous once on the ball. But there's a reason people are excited with the youngster, and it is more than fans' need to crown the new American Pele.

He exemplifies the type of play American fans enjoy: he has a modicum of talent, he's calm and intelligent, and he's scrappy. It's telling on the field. His energy and ability to convert that into positive outcomes (rather than just running around like so many other high speed/high energy forwards), makes him an easy player to support.

End Game Notes: As a number of writers have mentioned in pregame articles, a lot was riding on this friendly match-up. And even more was revealed.

To recap, the U.S. improved its reputation as a very dangerous team for elite opponents to play. This is an important standard to keep. It garners wide respect and only improves the team's popularity and support.

Moreover, the direction, formation, and viable players are becoming clear. The U.S. needs to employ two forwards (as a single player has not emerged)—and the midfield will need to run with Dempsey and Donovan outside. They'll also need the freedom to run inside, supported by an attacking midfielder, as well as a holding or defensive midfielder in front of the defense.

The central pair will have to cover for Dempsey and Donovan on counters—at least until they can track back as they get more comfortable with their attacking roles. Manchester United employed a similar system when they ran Ronaldo, Rooney and Tevez together.

It's not bad being a poor man's Manchester United.

The secret is finding the right central midfielders (exactly what Man U. had to do).

And at the same time, Bob Bradley will need to reinvent his back line. He has four years—and hopefully, a strong Gold Cup performance and a Confederations Cup—to figure it all out.

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